



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

the natives there exists a real worship of the dead" (p. 338). Yet the contradiction, if lessened, is still not removed; and it is well to remind ourselves that "the worship of the dead" is a slippery and controversial phrase. Controversial, too, is the question of the relation of magic to religion; Dr. Frazer, as is but natural, sees his own view confirmed in cases where another interpretation appears possible. In such matters, difference of opinion, in the present state of our knowledge, is inevitable, and a clear-cut hypothesis has at any rate the value of a fixed point of rally and attack. I could wish, on the other hand, that Dr. Frazer might some day break loose from associationism, which as psychology is outworn and as theory of knowledge is, I imagine, in no better case. We shall not solve the puzzles of the primitive mind until we approach it by way of a sound general psychology.

The impression which the book leaves is that of the tremendous consequences—moral, social, political, economic—which the belief in human immortality has brought in its train: once again, in the history of science, a remote and curious study proves to be of great "practical" importance. In detail, the volume is full of interesting things. Ghosts in Central Melanesia are "naturally in a dazed state at first on quitting their familiar bodies" (p. 358); and ghosts in the civilized world, if we may trust the mediums, suffer a like disability. Among the Melanesians, again, faith (quite logically) kills as well as cures; the natives of the Banks Islands have invented a portable ghost-shooter,—which sometimes hits the wrong man; and the Fijian, learning that he is the object of "malicious animal magnetism," lies down and dies (pp. 387, 414). Interesting from another point of view are the questions to which, as yet, no answer can be returned: "the whole question of the meaning of burnt sacrifice is still to a great extent obscure" (p. 349); and there are many special (p. 462) and more or less general (p. 428) practices of which the same thing must be said.

The printing of the book is excellent. Aside from a few minor slips in the foot-notes, I have marked only one misprint: *consumeri* for *consumere* on p. 346.

E. B. T.

The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson. By EDOUARD LE ROY. Authorized translation by Vincent Benson. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1913. pp. v-235.

In the first division of this book, Le Roy discusses the method and the teaching of Bergson, giving a survey of the problems of immediacy, duration, perception, liberty, evolution, consciousness, life, matter, knowledge; while in the second division, he treats each of these problems in a more detailed and critical manner. Le Roy conceives the critic's task to be one of interpretation of the spirit of the work, rather than to be one of mere enumeration of contents. He believes that misunderstandings to be feared, should be pointed out and anticipated. That Bergson believes Le Roy to have accomplished this we learn from a statement, quoted in the introduction, which Bergson made to Le Roy—"Underneath and beyond the method you have caught the *intention* and the *spirit*. . . . Your study could not be more conscientious and true to the original." That Bergson has not over-praised becomes clear upon a reading of this masterful little presentation of Bergson's philosophy, but what is perhaps not made so clear is the proof of Le Roy's statement that the readers of Bergson "will find the curtain drawn between themselves and

reality suddenly fall and reality stand forth fully revealed." Rather, we should say, that if the curtain is to fall it will more probably do so after a reading of Le Roy than after reading Bergson. The author regards Bergson's philosophy as effecting a revolution equal in importance to that effected by "Kant or even Socrates." For him this philosophy is not a poetical delusion but the result of exhaustive research. Whether we give or refuse complete or partial adherence to it, we have at least all received from it a regenerating shock. He finds it to be in accord with the tendency of the age to question the justification of a deification of science, to distrust the adequacy of intellectualism and to employ, instead, a method of complete experience. To-day everything is regarded from the point of view of life, and there is a tendency more and more to recognize the primacy of spiritual activity.

The following are the main points of Bergson's philosophy, as interpreted by Le Roy. Common-sense (the result of intelligence "living, working, acting, fashioning, and informing itself") before the rational and perceptive function has emerged, is prepossessed in a practical direction, and accordingly has subjected the facts of primal intuition in the direction of utility. Now, even perception, in the usual sense, means the resolution of a problem, the verification of a theory. But we must so mobilize our perspective faculties that we become capable of following all the paths of *virtual* perception, of which the common anxiety for the practical has made us choose one only. Philosophy must free intelligence from these utilitarian habits by endeavoring at the outset to become clearly conscious of them. In order to come into immediate contact with reality, philosophy must renounce the usual forms of analytic and synthetic thought and achieve a direct intuitional effort. "This does not mean to quit experience, quite the contrary, but to extend it and diversify it by science; while, at the same time, by criticism, we correct in it the disturbing effects of action and finally quicken all the results thus obtained by an effort of sympathy, which will make us familiar with the object until we feel its profound throbbing and its inner wealth." This intuition is not a mysterious, mystical thing; it is a method of going from things to concepts,—of incessantly creating new thoughts and incessantly recasting the old. It is thus in opposition to the cinematographic method of analysis by concepts, which, though it presents ever so large an accumulation of conceptual actions, will never reconstruct the movement itself. There is one case in which this "sympathetic revelation" is almost easy to us,—that is in the case of ourselves. This inner world is one of pure quality. In its true nature it is an uninterrupted flow; it is ceaseless change. It is becoming, progress, growth; it is creative process which never ceases to labor incessantly; it is *duration*. Man is free when his acts proceed from his entire personality. In the study of external nature, also, if we do away with the ready-made concepts of mechanism and finality, we find that vital evolution is a dynamic continuity, a continuity of qualitative progress; it is essentially duration, an irreversible rhythm, 'a work of inner maturation.' By the memory inherent in it, the whole of the past is forever present in it . . . that is, it is experience. It perpetually invents, defying alike anticipation and repetition. The vital impulse consists in a "demand for creation." "Consciousness as the original and fundamental reality, always present in a myriad degrees of tension and sleep and under infinitely various rhythms, is present everywhere. Its effort sends out a current of

ascending realization which again determines the counter-current of matter. Thus we should not speak of mind and matter, but rather of spiritualization and materialization, the latter resulting automatically from a simple interruption of the former." Thus, in a word, the philosophy of Bergson is a philosophy of *duration*.

Especially valuable are Le Roy's answers to many of the sweeping criticisms that have been made of Bergson's philosophy. Philosophical intuition is not "aesthetic intuition": it is not a return to Romanticism, but a new logical method. "It does not seek to attain knowledge by renouncing intelligence, placing it under tutelage, or abandoning it to the blind suggestions of feeling and will, but seeks to reinforce intelligence by the initial resources (now represented in instinct), which under the dominance of practical demands it has sacrificed." The philosophy of Bergson does not abolish the problems of morality and of the intellect.

Although a reader can hardly agree with many statements which the author's enthusiasm and complete acceptance of Bergson's philosophy leads him to make, and although he is not bound to accept the statement that this is a new philosophy (for he may rather agree with those who find much reason to term Bergson the "modern Heraclitus"), yet the book as a whole is the most valuable appreciative statement of the spirit and trend of the philosophy, that the reviewer has found in a reading of much of the Bergsonian literature.

Clark University.

Ivy G. CAMPBELL.